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ABSTRACT  
The Question Concerning Heidegger: Technology and  
Being, a Deeper Understanding. (August 2006) 
James Michael Taylor, B.A., Dallas Baptist University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:   Dr. Theodore George 
 
 
 The primary goal of this thesis is to show that Martin Heideggers philosophy of 
technology stems directly from his ontology. Specifically that his notion of technology, 
as the enframing destining spirit of this age, is a revelation of being itself as technology 
in this age. The thesis begins with an introduction that sets up the major points and 
briefly summarizes each of the chapters. Chapter I primarily deals with the question of 
what motivates Heidegger to reflect philosophically on technology. This idea is also 
broadened to include the basic experiences and concepts that might cause anyone to 
reflect on technology. The historical, scientific, metaphysical, practical, personal, and 
spiritual are the motivational forces that drive someone to philosophize about 
technology. This is shown through an analysis of selected works from Iain Thomson, 
Don Ihde, W.P.S. Dias, and Hubert Dreyfus. The chapter ends with a return to the notion 
of being. Chapter II mainly deals with a textual analysis of the introduction to Being and 
Time, and The Question Concerning Technology. The idea of being is examined in 
detail, and a workable notion of being is extracted from the text. Then Heideggers 
philosophy of technology is explained using the QCT. These ideas are put together and it 
is shown that technology is being as the destining of this present age. Yet technology 
 iv
poses a danger to being, and indeed to humanity. The third chapter examines the 
alternatives to this danger in the form of Heideggers saving power, as discussed in his 
essay The Turning. The lesser dangers of technology are also reconsidered, as the truth 
of Heideggers answer comes to light. The truth of the saving power is that releasement 
towards a new destining will surmount the danger of technology. Yet this reveals that 
being takes a care for humanity, and this opens up the path for the unconcealing of 
Gods active power in the world of technology. Ultimately, only God can save humanity 
from the danger of technology, but He will only be revealed through the new destining 
revealing of being.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
This thesis is an exploration of Heideggers philosophy of technology, its 
connection and placement to his project on being, and how that philosophy opens up a 
comportment towards the technological problems of society. This comportment in turn 
reveals a path, a way, to see an original interpretation of Heideggers notion of God 
already operating in the world of technology. Among the key themes considered will be 
how Heideggers philosophy of technology addresses the problems of technology, the 
philosophical and historical motivations behind his project, and how this project reveals 
the possibility of Gods appearance. The key works addressed include the introduction to 
Being and Time, The Question Concerning Technology, and The Turning. These works 
will be analyzed to see how they denote the concept of being, and how that concept is 
crucial to understanding Heideggers philosophy of technology. For Heidegger, 
technology threatens humanity in a unique physical and psychological manner, but it 
also reveals something about human physicality and psychology. Heideggers 
philosophy of technology reveals not only the danger inherent in the technical, but also 
how this danger can be surmounted. The danger threatening humanity is not something 
that can simply be overcome, rather the strength of Heideggers words sounds forth in 
the turning towards the possibility of God.1 
                                                
 
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style. 
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The first chapter of this thesis will deal primarily with a need to understand the 
motivation for turning to Heideggers philosophy of technology. Yet here we will also 
look at this idea broadly as we seek to understand the motivating force behind the 
philosophy of technology itself. The discussion in the first chapter will focus on several 
different motivating forces behind the philosophy of technology, and specifically 
Heideggers philosophy. These different forces are here represented by select secondary 
sources from Iain Thomson, Don Ihde, W.P.S. Dias, and Hubert Dreyfus. The discussion 
begins with Thomsons study of the historical metaphysical influences on Heideggers 
work. Thomson references Nietzsche and Kant to show their motivating force behind 
Heideggers philosophy of technology. In contrast to Thomson, Don Ihde takes a 
historical scientific approach. Ihde sees Heidegger as influenced by the prevailing 
scientific thought of his day, and sees his philosophy of technology as a reaction to the 
new science of quantum physics. Ihde argues for a philosophical failure and is not 
convinced that Heideggers philosophy adequately deals with the problems of particular 
technologies. To that end W.P.S. Dias, an engineer, points out precisely what are the 
problems of particular technologies. For Dias, the motivating force is practical 
experience with technologies themselves. Thus he sets about classifying four kinds of 
dangerous technologies that call for philosophical reflection.  
It is in Hubert Dreyfus that the motivations for a philosophy of technology are 
revealed as personal, philosophical and spiritual. Dreyfus deals with the connection 
between technology and being, as he attempts to explain Heideggers conception of God. 
The first chapter ends having covered all the motivations for this study, but without 
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adequately dealing with the need for a god. If this original understanding of Heideggers 
God is to be grasped then his philosophy of technology must be taken up anew, 
beginning with the understanding of being. 
The second chapter begins with a textual analysis of Heideggers notion of being, 
as it is outlined in the introduction to Being and Time, and in the secondary literature. 
This notion of being will in turn be applied to the Question Concerning Technology in an 
effort to show forth being in technology, as the primary aim and true agenda of 
Heideggers philosophy of technology. Namely, that the essence of technology is the 
enframing and the enframing is being itself, as it is destined in this present age. The 
second chapter will conclude by explaining the supreme danger that Heidegger saw in 
technology, and point the way to the saving power in the third chapter.  
The third chapter will begin with a textual analysis of The Turning. Specifically 
this analysis will reiterate the significance of understanding the true danger of the 
essence of technology. The analysis will introduce the idea of the saving power as 
contrasting with the danger that Heidegger puts forward in the QCT. This in turn will 
lead to a discussion of the notion of turning as a comportment towards remaining open 
and patient. This comportment is a possible answer to the supreme danger of the 
enframing. Finally the third chapter will contain a concluding discussion of the 
significance of Heideggers solution in light of the problems of particular technologies. 
The concluding discussion will invoke the closing lines of the Turning as revealing a 
path for understanding an original concept of Heideggers. It shows how the 
surmounting power of a new destining of being is already active even in the face of 
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threatening technologies. The danger is being surmounted by the saving power, as a new 
destining of being is revealing itself. Yet all this leads to a revelation of the possibility of 
Gods unveiling. An original understanding of Heideggers God might be unconcealed 
in that Gods will reveals the essence of being in each age. Then it may be that God acts 
to surmount the danger of technology by revealing a new destining of being. Yet this 
revelation of God still remains only possible in the works of Heidegger, and indeed it 
does not yet exist as fully revealed in this age. Though the enframing is surmounted in 
the very revealing of it as the enframing, it is still not destroyed. Rather it may be 
changed even now, but this is still a changing that must be waited on. Patience for the 
revealing of being is the proposed answer to the problems of technology, as Heideggers 
God may be all that can save us.
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CHAPTER II 
WHAT CALLS FOR QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY? 
2.1 Introduction 
To begin this study of Heidegger it is necessary to ask several questions. The 
primary question is what motivates one to study Heideggers philosophy of technology? 
Still, this question can be restructured in such a way as to reveal a mystery deeper than 
the authors motivations. The question could be asked, what calls for philosophical 
reflection on the topic or idea of technology itself? Surely when the question is asked in 
that way, it is already assumed that technology is an idea that yields itself up for the 
work of the philosopher. There is something within the nature of technology that allows 
it to be questioned and sought after as idea. If technology is nothing more than machines 
and human devices then a philosophy of technology must refine itself into many 
philosophies of technology. If there is a fundamental thread that connects all things 
technological then perhaps a philosophy of technology can be motivated.  
That a philosophy of technology is not only possible, but also necessary is one of 
the key points of Heideggers works on the subject. A good analysis would turn to The 
Question Concerning Technology and The Turning as the two major works on 
Heideggers philosophy of technology. These are notable works from Heideggers late 
period, and they provide the grounds for establishing Heideggers philosophy of 
technology. Heideggers work on this subject seems to be motivated by a pursuit of the 
understanding of being. The root of Heideggers philosophy of technology lies in his 
ontology, and in the question of being. This thesis will also give an analysis of the 
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concept of being as Heidegger gives it in the introduction to his work Being and Time. 
Some scholars have even put forth the idea that the question of being is Heideggers 
lifelong project.1 The relationship of Heideggers ontology to his philosophy of 
technology is one of the notions at stake in understanding the motivations for this 
philosophical inquiry.  
In order to adequately motivate a philosophy of technology then perhaps it will 
be best to approach the problem from several angles. The first question that one 
considers, when determining what calls for a philosophy of technology, is the historical 
question. What motivated Heidegger himself, as a man living in a certain day and age, to 
reflect on technology as an issue of philosophical inquiry? If one understands the 
influences that caused Heidegger to write on technology, then perhaps one can the 
significance of the issue. Iain Thomson and Don Ihde consider the historical question 
very well in their writings. Thomson attempts to understand the philosophical influences 
behind Heideggers works, and the world in which he lived. He concludes that 
Heidegger is motivated by an understanding of the historical influence of Nietzsches 
metaphysics, and the resulting ontotheological construction of the world. Thomson 
understands the philosophy of technology itself as being motivated by Nietzsches 
metaphysics. Indeed it is the force that motivates the technological construction of the 
world, as well as the study of that construction.2 Don Ihde paints a very different picture 
of Heideggers motivations. Ihde sees Heidegger as being historically influenced by the 
                                                
 
1 Dorothea Frede, The Question of Being, in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. 
Charles Guignon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 42. 
 
2 Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19. 
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prevailing scientific thought of his day. Heideggers philosophy of technology is less of 
a response to technology itself, than it is to a certain interpretive scientific mindset that 
Heidegger picks up during his education. Ihde argues that Heideggers philosophy of 
technology is motivated as a reaction to the new brand of science he saw developing at 
the time Heidegger wrote. Ihde also picks up on the pure novelty of certain aspects of 
Heideggers thought. Though he may have been simply motivated, Heidegger still 
managed to foresee the reality of a blending of science and technology in technoscience. 
Ihde further argues that Heidegger would have done better to create a philosophy that 
could deal with various forms of technology.3 
The general motivation for a philosophy of technology can be seen as a practical 
response to such technologies. Although it was perhaps not his strongest motivation, 
Heidegger was quite aware of the influence of technologies in creating his philosophy of 
technology. The question can be phrased in this manner, What about technologies 
themselves motivates philosophical reflection on technology itself? It is the work of 
engineer W.P.S. Dias that provides elaboration on this question. Dias writes from the 
practical standpoint of a man who is a technician by trade, and he sees four different 
dangers inherent in all technologies. Dias writes about the effects of physically 
hazardous, unjust, sociologically damaging, and psychologically destructive 
technologies. He finds those four areas to be the main areas of concern that tend to 
motivate questions about technology. Technology, in its many forms, elicits certain 
                                                
 
3 Don Ihde, Was Heidegger Prescient Concerning Technoscience, Existentia 11 (2001), 374. 
(hereafter cited in text as Ihde) 
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dangers and hazards that cause humanity to reflect on its nature. Dias is convinced that 
Heidegger was particularly motivated by the psychological and sociological threats of 
certain technologies.4 However, the strongest factors that motivated Heidegger, and also 
the author of this thesis, remain unaddressed. 
One must now return to the question of the relation of being to technology, and 
consider its philosophical and spiritual motivations. The answer to the question of how 
being relates to technology is that being is technology; or rather that technology can be 
identified with being. Technology is the aspect of being that exists as the fundamental 
destiny of this modern age. The significance of this lies in what Heidegger describes so 
well in his Introduction to Metaphysics. The question is: Is being a mere word and its 
meaning a vapor, or does what is designated by the word being hold within it the 
historical destiny of the west?5 It is Hubert Dreyfus who takes up the question of 
Heideggers personal philosophical motivations.6 Dreyfus delves into the connection 
between being and technology; ultimately deciding that being is technology. Dreyfus 
understands that the nature of being as historical destining is something that is 
sociologically created. He concludes that humanity may usurp the power of technology 
by creating a new destining. Dreyfus interprets Heideggers search for a god in light of 
this revelation. Yet if being holds the spiritual destiny of the west and being is 
                                                
 
4 W.P.S. Dias, Heideggers Relevance for Engineering: Questioning Technology, Science and 
Engineering Ethics 9, no.3 (July 2003), 390. (hereafter cited in text as Dias) 
 
5 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (Fredericksburg, VA: 
Yale University Press, 1987), 42. 
 
6 Hubert Dreyfus, Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology, in Technology and the 
Politics of Knowledge, ed. Feenberg and Hannay (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 53. 
(hereafter cited in text as Dreyfus) 
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technology, then an understanding of technology may yield a greater spiritual revelation 
than the one that Dreyfus puts forth. 
The aim of this first chapter is to answer the two-fold question, Why does 
Heidegger give a philosophy of technology, and what calls one to reflect on technology 
philosophically? The answer to that question is found through a study of four secondary 
sources that lay the foundation for this thesis. Thomson and Ihde deal with the historical, 
scientific influences that motivate this study. Dias deals with the practical, technological 
influences that motivate this study. Finally, Dreyfus deals with the personal, 
philosophical, and spiritual motivations behind this thesis. Ultimately the spiritual 
motivation is one in search of a god that only being can reveal. Yet this thesis first turns 
to the historical motivations put forward in Iain Thomsons work. 
2.2 Historical Metaphysical  
Thomsons understanding of ontotheology is the central idea behind his work on 
the subject of Heidegger and technology. This term refers to a peculiar philosophical 
practice unique to metaphysics. We have thus seen that the peculiar double grounding 
that metaphysics attempts would ontologically anchor its understanding of the being of 
entities in a basic entity and theologically derive it from (and so justify it by appeal to) a 
supreme entity.7 Thomson holds that ontotheology is precisely what Heidegger is 
criticizing when he criticizes traditional metaphysics. The idea that a single entity 
becomes the grounding for all entities, thereby deifying that entity, is the definition of 
                                                
 
7 Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology, 19. 
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ontotheology in this context. According to Thomson, Heidegger understands that this 
deification has taken a new form based on the writings of Nietzsche: 
Heidegger holds Nietzsches unthought metaphysics responsible for our 
nihilistic technological understanding of the being of entities and its devastating 
historical consequencesFirst, that Nietzsche understands the being of entities 
ontotheologically, as eternally recurring will-to-power (that is, in short, as sheer 
will-to-will), forces coming together and breaking apart with no end other than 
the self-augmentation by which these underlying forces perpetuate themselves.8 
 
The idea is that Nietzsche had a peculiar metaphysics in his writings. Nietzsches 
metaphysics reduced the being of entities and categorized them all under the super-entity 
of the will-to-power. The problem is that this gives entities no rich metaphysical 
understanding of themselves, but rather a mere impetus to self-augment. Second, that it 
is precisely this ontologically reductive understanding of the being of entities that 
encourages us late moderns implicitly to understand, and so generally to treat, all the 
entities with which we deal, ourselves included, as intrinsically meaningless Bestand, 
mere resources9 For Thomson, Heideggers philosophy of technology is a direct 
reaction to the effects of Nietzschean metaphysics on the world. It is the understanding 
of the purpose of entities as simply will-to-self-augmentation that moves humanity to 
treat all entities as mere resources. 10 A big idea for Thomson is that Heideggers 
philosophy of technology is motivated by his understanding of metaphysics as 
                                                
 
8 Ibid., 44. 
 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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ontotheological, as reductive. This is the main influence on Heideggers philosophy of 
technology, according to Thomson.  
 However, Nietzsche is not the only significant influence on Heideggers work. 
Though Nietzsche was perhaps the key influence on the world Heidegger lived in, Kant 
was a strong influence on Heideggers philosophy itself: 
Heidegger, as I understand him, is a great critical heir of the German idealist 
tradition. His ontological critique of enframing builds on the Kantian idea that 
we implicitly participate in the making-intelligible of our worlds, but maintains 
that lenses inherited from metaphysics mediate our sense of reality. In effect 
Heidegger historicizes Kants discursivity thesis.11  
 
The phenomenological idea at stake is the same one that is threatened by Nietzsches 
works. If we make our world intelligible and understandable then we must take 
responsibility for its construction. Though if we receive our sense of the real from our 
metaphysics, then we create the world in light of an already present structure. It then 
seems quite true that metaphysics is responsible for the state of our world, and certainly 
for the state of our technological world. We can thus interpret Heideggers 
understanding of the ontotheological structure of Western metaphysics, (the history that 
we are) as advancing a doctrine of ontological holism. For by giving shape to our 
historical understanding of what is, metaphysics determines the most basic 
presuppositions of what anything is, ourselves included.12 Western metaphysics is not 
merely the recounting of the ideas of isolated individuals. Rather it is in some way 
responsible for projecting and creating the world in which humanity must live. This 
                                                
 
11 Ibid., 54. 
 
12 Ibid., 55. 
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projection is the result of a need to absolutize experience in search of meaning and 
purpose. That is not to say that life is basically meaningless, but that meaning itself is 
determined by the overriding metaphysics of the age. 
The significance of Thomsons contributions is that he points out some of the key 
influences on Heideggers thought. Heidegger was writing as a reaction to Nietzsche, 
and Heidegger was also writing from an informed German Idealist standpoint. In light of 
Thomsons comments, one of the motivating forces behind Heideggers philosophy is 
historical. Heidegger is simply putting forth the order of his ideas as they were created 
by his own implicit metaphysics. His metaphysics is a historical result of all 
metaphysicians, though Nietzsche and Kant are the central figures. Thomson also puts 
forth the critical idea that the era of technological enframing is the result of metaphysics. 
It is the end of the philosophical need to absolutize the world, and thereby impute 
meaning to it. The era of enframing is the ironic result of a metaphysical system that 
attempts to deny metaphysics. In so doing, the system that it unwittingly creates is a 
system that effectually denies meaning to the world itself. Still, this historical picture 
may not be complete. According to Don Ihde the motivation behind a philosophy of 
technology is historical and scientific, rather than being historical and metaphysical. 
2.3 Historical Scientific 
For Ihde, the most significant aspect of Heideggers writing on technology is the 
historical and ontological priority of technology over science. Ihde sees this move as a 
groundbreaking leap in the philosophy of science and he works to uncover Heideggers 
meaning in this move. Ihdes work, rather than containing a detailed analysis of 
 13
Heideggers writings on Technology, contains instead a historical analysis of 
Heideggers place in writing about technology and science. The idea behind this is that 
Heideggers philosophy of science and his philosophy of technology merged into the 
same entity with the creation of his philosophy of technoscience. Ihde first divides up 
Heideggers writings on technoscience into distinct periods: 
First there is the period around Being and Time (1927) which includes the Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, and stretches to the Kant work of 1929; second 
there is the richer period in the mid thirties with What is a Thing?, the Beitrage, 
and the famous World as Picture texts, and the period of the mid fifties, after 
the War and de-Nazification with The Question Concerning Technology, 
Science and Reflection, and related texts (Ihde, 374). 
 
The significance of these divisions is that Ihde is quite familiar with Heideggers work, 
and he is also familiar with any underlying project throughout it. The project that Ihde is 
focused on here is the development of Heideggers theory of technoscience.  
Ihde puts forth the notion that philosophical science in the early twentieth 
century was the key motivating force behind Heideggers philosophy of technology. 
There are three strands which bear examination: First, the emergent philosophies of 
science at the beginning of the 20th century which forefronted mathematization, in 
particular mathematical physicsSecond there was the powerful contemporary 
movement of Logical Positivism, and Logical Empiricismand, third, there is Husserl 
(Ihde, 375). These are the movements and thinkers that Ihde believes most characterized 
and influenced Heideggers notions of his philosophy of science. These influences gave 
rise to Heideggers notion of technoscience as seen in his philosophy of technology. Ihde 
goes into great detail regarding the facts about these movements and their influence on 
Heidegger, but his summary will suffice for the purposes of this thesis: 
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What has emerged at this point with respect to Heideggers implicit philosophy 
of science is largely reflective of the main trends of the time(a) Physics, 
particularly mathematical physics, remains the paradigm science for Heidegger; 
(b) physics is viewed as measuring  and following Husserl  a reductive 
science; (c) it is theoretical in form, and it is experimental only in a secondary 
sense because the theoretical cast calls for experiment to achieve exactness in 
measurement; (d) its epistemology is objectivist in that it must make its objects 
stand before it as representations (Ihde, 377). 
 
Ihde concludes by stating that the only Heideggerian twist on this notion of science is 
that Heidegger views science as aprioristic. In other words, science projects its already 
present structure onto nature, and only understands nature through this structure. The 
same can be said of technology and mathematics (Ihde, 377-378). Ihdes comments 
mirror Thomsons notions about the projective nature of metaphysics. Despite his 
confidence Heideggers philosophy of science underwent a significant critique from the 
new science of the mid twentieth century. 
This new science, quantum and nuclear physics, posed a significant challenge to 
Heideggers notions of science on both an intellectual and political level. Ihde expounds 
on some of Heideggers writings that show his understanding of this new physics in its 
historical context. I read this in two ways: first it shows that Heidegger was aware of 
the classical/new physics controversy cast in its racist contest; and second he uses it to 
firmly maintain his continuist position concerning the projective and aprioristic views of 
science (Ihde, 379). Ihde makes a point of showing how Heideggers philosophy of 
science eventually grew to incorporate and understand this new turn in physics. 
Heidegger came to understand this change in physics as mirroring the changes in the 
destining of being as a new epoch (Ihde, 380). 
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Yet for Ihde the most startling turn for Heidegger comes in The Question 
Concerning Technology, since it is there that Heidegger reverses a common relation 
regarding science and technology. Heidegger argues that the standard view that 
modern technology arises from and is an application of early modern science is wrong; it 
is rather the inverse (Ihde, 380). It is this inversion that Ihde terms technoscience, 
and it has two strong implications for Heideggers philosophy of science:  
The first is more concrete in that Heidegger sees that physics and its instruments 
might also be understood inverselyThe second implication, however, is more 
abstract  it is only by turning Technology [capitalized] into a metaphysics that 
it becomes possible for Heidegger to claim that science itself is subsumed into 
Technology (Ihde, 385).  
 
What Heidegger is after, according to Ihde, is an understanding of technology as 
metaphysics and as a mode of revealing of being. This revelation is perhaps one of 
Ihdes keenest insights even though Ihde saw this move as something of a loss. Ihde 
concludes that Heideggers thinking may be prescient, but also deeply flawedIn short 
the elevation to technology with the capital T emasculates Heideggers philosophy of 
technology from making any nuanced conclusions about particular technologies (Ihde, 
386). Although he was motivated by a strong philosophy of science Heidegger is 
ultimately making a metaphysical move.  
If technology is absolutized then it looks like Heidegger is guilty of the very 
ontotheology Thomson claims that he is criticizing. Ihde sees this as a loss of 
philosophical richness, since technologies are too widely varied to be taken as a single 
entity. Both Ihde and Thomson focus on the historical influences on Heideggers work, 
in order to show the motivations for a philosophy of technology. Though Ihde is 
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complimentary of Heideggers foresight he is disappointed in Heideggers seeming 
inability to say anything about individual technologies. An alternative is seen in W.P.S. 
Dias who claims that Heideggers philosophy not only addresses individual 
technologies, but also that it might be motivated by them as well. 
2.4 Practical Technologies 
Dias makes no secret of the fact that he is writing from a perspective that is at 
least pro-engineering, if not pro-technology. However, Dias still makes the effort to 
understand Heideggers position on the subject before he passes judgment. To that end 
he gives a fair and textually accurate interpretation of The Question Concerning 
Technology. Dias offers an interpretation of Heideggers supposed fear of technology, 
and the cure for the apparent problem of technology:  
Among the many aspects of Being questioned by Heidegger were those of 
science and modern technology, which he thought reduced everything (including 
man) to the level of a mere resource. In his later writing, he was preoccupied 
with poetry, which he considered to be an antidote to modern technology (Dias, 
390).  
 
Dias puts forth the idea that Heideggers ultimate answer to these dangers is a turn to art, 
as a separate mode of revealing.  
Yet Dias finds this abstract understanding of technology inadequate to genuinely 
raise strong philosophical questions. Indeed, what motivates Dias to turn to a philosophy 
of technology is an attempt to become a better engineer: 
Given the pervasive and significant impact of technology on our lives and 
society, it would do well for engineers too to engage in such questioning as an 
integral part of their practice, since they are agents of technology. This would 
also result in more balanced critiques of technology. Currently critics of 
technology tend to be largely philosophers or environmentalist, both of whom are 
sometimes unrealistic in their rejection of technology (Dias, 392). 
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Dias may not be entirely certain about what motivates Heidegger to turn to a philosophy 
of technology, but as an engineer he seems to be motivated by technology itself. Dias is 
not convinced that technology is a purely metaphysical entity, and rather than absolutize 
it, he lays out four different types of dangerous technologies. 
These four categories are the ones that Dias considers to have the most sinister 
effect on humanity. In addition they are best understood as placeholders for actual 
technological devices, rather than purely abstract metaphysical entities. Dias is 
convinced that these four categories are the motivating forces behind any philosophy of 
technology. The first level is that of dangerous or hazardous technology. The prime 
example of this is nuclear technology (Dias, 392-393). The nuclear weapon is surely 
the most striking example of such a machine. Nuclear power itself bears out historical 
examples of catastrophe in the failure at Chernobyl, and the intentional destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Dias understands that certain types of technology pose a direct 
and obvious threat to human existence, and that this threat must be eliminated by the 
cessation of production, and use of these technologies (Dias, 392-393). The second 
level is one that is not necessarily dangerous for the entire human race, but where 
technology promotes injustice (Dias, 393). The idea here is that the benefits of certain 
technological advances are only available to either their producers, or those 
economically gifted enough to afford them. Either way technological growth defines and 
deepens class differences in societies. A computer is as ubiquitous as a television in 
many homes in the west, but it is also only available to those who can afford it. However 
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Dias also holds that technological advances are responsible for bringing prosperity and 
wealth to the previously poor and un-prosperous (Dias, 393).  
These first two modes of influence stem from what Dias terms the environmental 
critique of technology, and the last two stem from what he calls the philosophical 
critique. We come now to the third level and with it to the less obvious influences of 
technology; this is the sociological influence of technology, mainly through its 
manifestations, whether artifacts or systems (Dias, 393). Dias references the 
transportation and communication systems that technologies are responsible for. On the 
one hand these technologies facilitate the ability of everyone in society to travel and 
communicate. Yet the sense of community is often lost due to the availability of 
community. Transportation technologies can turn family and friends into available 
family and friends at the end of a plane ride or car drive. This might serve to create 
societies of very disparate, individualistic people, who would rather communicate over 
the phone than in person (Dias, 393). The deepest level is the psychological influence 
of technology (Dias, 393). Dias calls this influence a technological attitude, where 
technique is valued over understanding, and means are valued over ends. Also 
interesting is how inventions such as the clock and computer changed how people are 
valued (Dias, 393). The most striking example one might think of is the cell phone. The 
cell phone can make a person always available to anyone and everyone who can dial 
their number. Indeed, there seems to be something about a ringing phone that demands 
that it be answered. The cell phone has an immediacy that requires other things to be 
paused, or delayed, so that the cell phone can be dealt with. One is always waiting for it 
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to ring and demand its use. Thus solitude is impossible and reflection is available to 
interruption without warning or notice.  
Dias concludes his work by pointing out the ethical considerations of 
Heideggers work. Heidegger described our interaction with the world as one of 
careEngineering Ethics has also be treated as an ethic of care (Dias, 394). Were he 
to end there, Dias might be advocating a Heideggerian method of engineering, but in fact 
Dias has more to say. It is pertinent to point out two warnings at this stage. This first is 
to ensure that questioning technology does not lead to jettisoning all of it, as is 
sometimes espoused by anti-technologists (Dias, 395). It is not clear that Dias 
understands just what technology is a revealing of, namely being, if he considers the 
possibility of jettisoning it. Although it seems clear that Dias is quite optimistic and 
hopeful concerning the future of technological growth and expansion. Heidegger viewed 
neither of these as unreservedly optimistic. Furthermore, his existentialist philosophy is 
at the core nihilistic, for he said that there was no ultimate ground for our being; and it is 
not clear that ethics can be founded on such nihilism (Dias, 395). The accusation of 
nihilism may come from a misapprehension of Heideggers project concerning being. 
Dias is convinced that a philosophy of technology can be motivated by the abuse of 
certain technological devices. It seems that even technologies can motivate the 
philosophy of technology. However, while he avoids the ontotheological accusation, 
Dias is sure that Heideggers core philosophy is nihilistic. This closes him off to 
understanding the deeper motivations that Heidegger and others may have for a 
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philosophy of technology. It is Hubert Dreyfus who understands all too well the deep 
personal philosophical motivations that drive Heideggers philosophy of technology. 
2.5 Personal, Philosophical, and Spiritual 
In a work on Heideggers philosophy of technology Dreyfus begins with a 
section he entitles, What Heidegger is not Saying (Dreyfus, 53). In this section 
Dreyfus admits that Heidegger can be understood as anti-technology, and that there are 
several passages in his works where Heidegger makes anti-technological statements. 
Such statements suggest that Heidegger is a Luddite who would like to return from the 
exploitation of the earth, consumerism, and mass media to the world of the pre-Socratic 
Greeks or the good old Schwartzwald peasants (Dreyfus, 54). Dreyfus also admits that 
this is a gross oversimplification of Heideggers work, and that there is something more 
complex going on here.  
Dreyfus sees Heidegger as realizing that technology is a far more pervasive 
threat than mere machine technology would seem to indicate. Thus, his philosophy of 
technology is motivated by more than mere technologies themselves. The very 
metaphysical move that Ihde criticizes in Heidegger is what Dreyfus sees as the most 
helpful step in Heideggers philosophy of technology. Dreyfus phrases the condition that 
Heidegger has uncovered in these terms, The threat is not a problem for which there 
can be a solution but an ontological condition from which we can be saved. Heideggers 
concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather 
than the destruction caused by specific technologies (Dreyfus, 54). Dreyfus understands 
that Heideggers philosophy of technology is motivated by his greater metaphysical 
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project, the project of being. The danger, then, is not the destruction of nature or culture 
but a restriction in our way of thinking  a leveling of our understanding of being 
(Dreyfus, 55). The danger of technology is its limiting of the revealing of being itself. 
Dreyfus then attempts a definition of being that sets the tone for his work. In sum the 
social practices containing an understanding of what it is to be a human self, those 
containing an interpretation of what it is to be a thing, and those defining society fit 
together. They add up to an understanding of Being (Dreyfus, 55). It is this 
understanding of being that defines the world for the beings in it, and Dreyfus references 
the Heideggerian concept of clearing to make this point. Dreyfus notion of being 
seems to mirror Thomsons notion of metaphysics as the driving human force that 
projects the world up in the way that it is. If so, Dreyfus Heidegger seems to be another 
ontotheologist, as he absolutizes being as the supreme entity. However the key idea at 
work is that Heidegger turns to a philosophy of technology as a result of his ontology. 
The motivating force for Heidegger can be seen in the personal philosophic force that 
drives much of his work, the pursuit of an understanding of being.  
Once he has defined Heideggers notion of being, Dreyfus applies it in the 
question of the essence of technology, or what is the technological understanding of 
being (Dreyfus, 53)? Dreyfus explains that Heidegger draws a difference between 
classical and modern technology, and that the essence of modern technology is being 
asked after in the question. The essence of modern technology, Heidegger tells us, is to 
seek more and more flexibility and efficiency simply for its own sake (Dreyfus, 56). To 
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apply this concept to Dreyfus notion of being means that the human self, things, and the 
rules of society all work towards the end of pure efficiency.  
Dreyfus is not content to leave the matter here and he turns next to what humans 
can do about this danger. Dreyfus admits that Heidegger does not seek to abandon all 
forms of technology, but rather he seeks to form a new understanding of technology 
itself. Dreyfus calls for a disassociation of the technological understanding of being from 
technological devices. This disassociation can only be achieved by understanding 
technology as our latest understanding of being (Dreyfus, 57). This conclusion in turn 
causes Dreyfus to raise two options for responding to his new understanding of being. 
The first is simply to realize this technological understanding of being as the destining of 
our age. That is to accept the mystery of the gift of understandings of being, which 
Dreyfus refers to as releasement, again using Heideggers terms (Dreyfus, 58-59). Yet 
Dreyfus finds this realization to be insufficient, for it will only be a realization if it is a 
realization in our practices as well: 
Mere openness to technology, it seems, leaves out much that Heidegger finds 
essential to human being: embedded-ness in nature, nearness or localness, shared 
meaningful differences such as noble and ignoble, justice and injustice, salvation 
and damnation, mature and immature to name those that have played important 
roles in our history (Dreyfus, 59).  
 
There seems to be a motivating force at work that goes beyond the apparent need to 
understand the philosophical connection between being and technology. If releasement is 
insufficient to defeat the specter of threatening technology, then what can save humanity 
from this danger? Dreyfus is not surprised that such releasement seems to leave out a 
consideration of the shared meaningful differences of salvation and damnation. Perhaps 
 23
it is the necessity of salvation that leads Dreyfus to his understanding of Heideggers 
need for a god. The need for a new centeredness is reflected in Heideggers famous 
remark in his last interview: Only a god can save us now. But what does this mean 
(Dreyfus, 59)? 
Dreyfus is not convinced that Heidegger merely wanted a realization of the 
technological understanding of being. Instead, the new practices that make up a new 
understanding of being are the only real option that humanity can consider. This is the 
second choice for a response to Dreyfus new understanding of being. If the 
understanding of being is merely the destining of our age, as made up by the practices of 
society, then surely a new understanding of being can be created from new practices.  
This is how Dreyfus answers Heideggers quest for a god. When one searches for the 
spiritual motivating force behind a philosophy of technology, one is seeking to 
understand how being can reveal a god. Dreyfus gives a seemingly humanistic 
interpretation of Heideggers words. Such a new object or event that grounded a new 
understanding of reality Heidegger would call a new god. This is why he holds that only 
another god can save us (Dreyfus, 60). Dreyfus holds that the translation another is a 
fitting match for the German word, and explains that this new god came in the form of 
the original American Musical festival at Woodstock. Such a shift of cultural paradigms 
is what Dreyfus advocates that could bring about a new destining. The best part is that 
festival was a particular human activity, and though it failed to be greatly revolutionary, 
the spirit of the event is precisely what Dreyfus takes the new god to be. This new god 
certainly may fit within the Nietzschean concern of what must replace the dead God in 
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his aphorism The Madman.13 Woodstock is a great game and a marvelous spectacle. Is 
this notion of a new god finally the thing that Heidegger is seeking?  
The force behind a philosophy of technology is wrapped up in the two-fold 
search for understanding Heideggers motivations as well the deeper philosophical 
motivations at work. Thomson seems to be convinced that this search is brought on by 
the influence of western metaphysics as it created the technological world in which we 
live. For Heidegger this search was brought about as a reaction to Nietzsche and Kant, 
and a quest to escape ontotheology. Yet, Ihde counters that Heidegger is also caught up 
in this ontotheology, and that he was led to his search by a certain philosophy of science 
that he ascribed to. It is technologies themselves that still seek for a nuanced philosophy 
that can appreciate their individual natures. Such a philosophical approach is the one that 
Dias takes as he seeks a philosophy of technology motivated by technologies 
themselves. This motivation in turn fails to see the deeper philosophical search for being 
that Heidegger was after. Though Dreyfus finds the understanding of being as 
Heideggers primary motivation, he is mystified by the need for a god. Dreyfus sees the 
spiritual destiny of the west as resting in the human activities that create grand new 
games for humanity to play. Throughout this study it may become apparent that 
releasement towards being will reveal the appearance of a God already at work in the 
present technological world. Thus, the motivating force behind a philosophy of 
technology must first find its grounding in an understanding of being. This thesis now 
                                                
 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter 
Kaufman (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 97. 
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turns to the end of seeking to understand Heideggers God through an understanding of 
being in technology.  
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CHAPTER III 
BEING AND THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to understand being in technology one must first grasp the main idea that 
is in question. The idea in question is in fact a question itself, and that question is what 
is the meaning of being? If being is a question then certainly much of what being is 
remains unknown. This may be the case for Heidegger, and it is this need to understand 
the question of the meaning of being that some say caused him to write Being and Time. 
Theodore Kisiel characterizes the aim of Being and Time in these terms: 
Accordingly the full sense of the human situation, already caught up in being in 
such a way that it is already questioned in its being and so put in quest of the 
sense of its being, will have to be worked out in order to prepare the basis for 
understanding the temporality already implicit in the question of the sense of 
being. The very sense of sense will have to be worked out to define at least the 
temporality of my being, and hopefully of being itself.14 
 
The human seeks to understand its essence, and in doing so it must understand its 
seeking as temporal. Only then will the human understand its essence, and begin to 
know that essence as revealing being. Some say that it is the understanding of being as 
being that makes up Heideggers lifelong philosophical project. Dorothea Frede explains 
that for Heidegger being is not simply his greatest idea but it is also his greatest pursuit. 
What can probably be claimed with more justification is that for most great minds there 
has been one question that guided their thinking or research. This certainly applies to 
Martin Heidegger, and the question that fascinated him throughout his long philosophic 
                                                
 
14 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993), 425. 
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life can be stated simply: what is the meaning of being?15 This frank assessment is 
reiterated in the work of Taylor Carman, who writes, The central theme of Heideggers 
philosophy is the question concerning the meaning (Sinn) of being (Sein).16 This 
question is present at the beginning in Being and Time and it remains a critical part of 
Heideggers work even on into his later period with Introduction to Metaphysics, and 
even the Question Concerning Technology. The question of the meaning of being is 
central to Heideggers project, and it also seems that being is a very significant idea for 
his understanding of technology. The question of being informs and fills out the question 
of technology. It would seem that the meaning of being must be explored before any 
attempt to understand technology can be successful. To that end this chapter has two 
simple purposes, to explore the meaning of the question of being and to interpret the 
question of technology in light of that exploration. 
3.2 Being 
An ideal place to begin the exploration of being as a question, concept, or idea is 
in the introduction to Heideggers Being and Time. Heidegger begins the book with a 
brief preface that outlines the fundamental problem with being: 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the 
word being? Not at all. Sot it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of 
the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to 
understand the expression Being? Not at all. So first we must reawaken an 
understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise 
is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely.17 
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16 Taylor Carman, Heideggers Analytic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8. 
 
17 Ibid. 
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Being remains a mystery, but it has settled itself into western thought so well as a 
mystery that its elusive nature is no longer a proper cause for reflection. In light of that 
mystery Heidegger states that the primary goal of his treatise is to work out the question 
of the meaning of Being.18 To understand being as being is to understand it as a 
question, not of being itself, but of the meaning of being. The first page of Being and 
Time makes it clear that Heideggers basic question was not about being, but about the 
meaning of being, der Sinn von Sein. The distinction between being and the meaning of 
being is utterly crucialit is the clue to distinguishing Heideggers thought from both 
traditional metaphysics, and Husserlian phenomenology.19 The significance of 
Heideggers starting place is that he is first and foremost inquiring. He is asking a 
question and it is not a question after being itself, but after the meaning of being. 
According to the quote from Sheehan, this is the most crucial point of Heideggers 
discussion. Now, if Heidegger is inquiring after the meaning of being and not being 
itself, then what precisely is Heidegger not inquiring after?  
In the first main division of the introduction to Being and Time Heidegger sets 
forth what he is in fact not searching after with regards to the meaning of being. He puts 
forth some of the history of the concept and deals with several ways in which being is 
either forgotten or misunderstood. Being is universal in scope, but not simply the 
greatest category of understanding. It is elusive to define, but that only makes the 
                                                
 
18 Ibid.  
 
19 Thomas Sheehan, Dasein, in A Companion to Heidegger ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. 
Wrathall (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 193. 
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question of meaning more pertinent. Finally it is self evident in everyday life, and yet it 
remains a most puzzling mystery. Frede characterizes the problem in these terms, What 
needs an explanation is, rather, why this dim understanding was never fully developed 
before, and a good deal of Heideggers originality consists in his explanation of what he 
calls our 'forgetfulness of Being.20 Heidegger concludes his discussion of the 
metaphysical shortcomings of past efforts as he grapples with the meaning of being. 
Rather than wiping away past follies he intends to build on these latent conceptions of 
being, and expand upon their shortcomings.   
If this common understanding of being is to be realized as anything other than 
vague and common, then being itself must come into a greater light. In the question 
which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being  that which determines entities 
as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may 
discuss them in detail.21 The meaning of being initially comes to light as that which 
determines entities as entities. It is Taylor Carman who describes this revelation as the 
closest thing to a definition of being in Being and Time.22 Carmans take on precisely 
what Heidegger means by being is informed by his sense of the main critique of 
Heideggers elusive definitions. Some critics maintain that Heideggers failure is a 
simple grammatical conflation, and that being has several meanings depending on its 
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usage. Carman rushes to Heideggers defense with his own unique take on Heideggers 
philosophy of the meaning of being.  
Heidegger does not assume that there is just one meaning. Indeed one of the 
central tenets of Being and Time is precisely that being, in whichever 
grammatical form, means something fundamentally different for different kinds 
of entities  existenz or being in the world (In-der-Welt-sein) for human beings, 
availability (Zuhandenheit) for things defined by their use, and occurrentness 
(Vorhandenheit) for objects, properties, and relations. The only unity Heidegger 
claims for the meaning of being has to do with its general intelligibility in terms 
of some temporal framework, or horizon.23 
 
Carman adequately paints the picture of the diverse meanings of being that Heidegger 
allows. Being is not the ultimate universal, and as such there is some variation between 
how being reveals itself to humans, or to things. This point alone will become incredibly 
significant for Heideggers philosophy of technology. If being does not exist as the 
ultimate, then perhaps there is something that goes beyond being itself. The vision of the 
spiritual may yet appear beyond the realm of being. 
Being must be thought of in its own way and on its own terms if being itself is to 
be reached. In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and Being means the 
Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated.24 The 
question of the meaning of being may be asking about the entities that are, that is to say, 
the entities that exist and have being. Here Heidegger gives a fuller definition of what 
being is. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in 
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presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the there is.25 Being qua 
being remains that which is, as it is presently, really, truthfully, in being there, and there 
being. It is the condition and grounds in terms of which all beings appear.  
 The question of the meaning of being is formulated in Being and Time through 
Heideggers analytic of Dasein. Yet since this thesis is an explication of Heideggers 
philosophy of technology, then this work must be abbreviated. In light of this 
abbreviation the secondary literature can be especially enlightening in an attempt to 
explain Dasein and its significance for being. Taylor Carman provides the following 
insight when he draws upon the ideas that Heidegger advances in Being and Time. 
Being is the intelligibility, or more precisely the condition of the intelligibility of 
entities as entities. Furthermore that intelligibility has two aspects: Every entity can, as 
an entity, be examined in a twofold question: what it is and whether it is (GP 123).26 
This twofold question is the one that Heidegger applies to Dasein in his search for the 
meaning of being. Since being is that which makes understanding possible, then being is 
in some ways already understood. Being is the revelation of the revelation; it is the 
reality that grounds reality. Yet being does not exist as fundamentally static. As much as 
being changes its revelation for different entities, its revelation changes for different ages 
as well. It becomes incumbent to speak of what being is for this present age, and how 
that relates to modern technology. 
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 If being is that which provides the conditions in virtue of which beings appear, 
then being certainly also provides the conditions for the appearance of entities in our 
own age. In this age it seems that technologies define the entities of this world. 
Technology is the destining of being in this age, for all humanity and the world. This 
point is introduced and explicated in Heideggers best-known work on technology, The 
Question Concerning Technology. For Heidegger, technology is not merely airplanes 
and skyscrapers, but rather it is being itself. Technology determines the conditions in 
light of which beings appear in this modern age. It reveals all entities as resources, and 
as either useful or useless. This chapter must now turn to a textual analysis of 
Heideggers Question Concerning Technology. The first step will examine first the 
nature of the question that the title implies, that is what is technology? Technology 
will be examined not merely as instrument, the common understanding, but in its 
essence as the enframing. The enframing is the essence of technology and it determines 
all entities as resources, as standing reserve. The outcome of this revelation is that 
technology reveals itself as a threatening mode of being. While it reigns as the mode of 
revealing beings in this age it threatens humanity and also all other modes of revealing. 
The enframing threatens humanity in that it deceives them into thinking they are masters 
of technology, and by its use, the masters of the earth. Then while being cannot be 
mastered it is humanity that finds itself mastered, by technology, as the primary agent of 
the enframing. Although the greatest threat that technology poses lies in its denial of the 
truth of being itself. The enframing threatens to subvert any other mode of revealing, 
even the mode of revealing being itself as being. Heidegger calls this threat the supreme 
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danger of technology. Being, as the condition of the intelligibility of entities seems to be 
perverted into the technological enframing that threatens to undermine being itself. Even 
in light of this danger there remains a hope in the form of a saving power. This chapter 
now turns to the opening of the Question Concerning Technology, as it seeks to 
formulate and understand this question in light of its relation to being.  
3.3 The Question 
 Heidegger begins the Question Concerning Technology by explaining that the 
project he is undertaking is one of questioning. The method of questioning in this work 
follows the same structure for questioning that Heidegger outlined for being in Being 
and Time.27 In the beginning Heidegger points out two things: that he is questioning and 
what he is questioning: 
Questioning builds a wayThe way is one of thinking. All ways of thinking, 
more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. 
We shall be questioning concerning technology and in so doing we should like to 
prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our 
human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this 
essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own 
bounds.28 
 
First it is significant that the structure of the questioning follows the same pattern as in 
Being and Time.  Technology is what is asked about. The essence of technology is what 
is being interrogated, and a free relationship to experience technology in its own bounds 
is what is sought. Heidegger has laid out his plan and he proceeds directly into his work.  
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 Initially he must ensure that technology is not confused with the essence of 
technology. What is being asked about is the essence of technology, rather than its 
aspects. Heidegger explains that technology is commonly thought to be something 
neutral, and this is the worst way in which one can misapprehend it (QCT, 311-312). In 
similar fashion to Being and Time Heidegger explains essence before he tackles the 
way in which the essence of technology is misunderstood. According to ancient 
doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing isThe current 
conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity can 
therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology (QCT, 
312). What technology is, in essence, is commonly thought of as a means to an end and 
something that is a particularly human activity. It is not naturally occurring in the world, 
but instead it is a human artifice. Heidegger maintains that this instrumental definition is 
accurate to describe technology in general and also modern technology. Though modern 
technology seems to be more complex, as surely as a plane is more complex than a 
wheel, it still remains instrumental by definition and practice. Yet here Heidegger 
reveals the crack in this finely crafted façade. Everything depends on our manipulating 
technology in the proper manner as a meansThe will to mastery becomes all the more 
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control. But suppose now that 
technology were no mere means: how would it stand with the will to master it (QCT, 
313)? Just suppose that technology is not merely instrumental, wouldnt this make our 
desire to master it somewhat complicated? 
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Heidegger asserts the crucial distinction between the correct and the true. It is 
correct that technology is instrumental, but this does not yet get at technologys true 
essence. Ronald Godzinksi Jr. explains that this distinction applies as much to modern 
technology as to technology in general. According to Heidegger, technology is distinct 
from what we do with tools, instruments, equipment, or the way of thinking about those 
things. Likewise, modern technology is not reducible to technological artifacts, devices, 
or the techniques that produce those things.29 The essence of technology remains 
captured only in the realm of the true. It is this sense of truth that reveals the answers to 
the new set of questions Heidegger raises next. We must ask: What is the instrumental 
itself? Within what do such things as means and end belong (QCT, 313)? As to the 
second question Heidegger answers almost immediately that the realm of means and 
ends is causality. Yet the answer to the first question must be delayed until the answer to 
the second question is fully understood. To that end Heidegger delves into an 
explanation of Aristotelian causality.  
 Heidegger gives an explanation of Aristotles four causes while explaining the 
role each plays in a thorough explanation of causality. Heidegger explains that this step 
is critical to understanding instrumentality, and with it the essence of technology (QCT, 
314). The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being 
responsible for something else (QCT, 314). The four causes are properly unified as 
causality. Heidegger gives the example of a silversmith constructing a silver chalice in 
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order to explain this unity. The causes do not create from nothing so much as they bring 
forth, and unify, what is in some sense already there: 
These let what is not yet present arrive into presencing. Accordingly they are 
unifiedly governed by a bringing that brings what presences into 
appearanceThe modes of occasioning, the four causes, are at play, then, within 
bringing-forth. Through  bringing-forth the growing things of nature as well as 
what ever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to 
their appearance (QCT, 317).  
 
The four causes bring something forth out of concealment into unconcealment, and this 
carries some very significant ideas for Heidegger. What is brought forth into 
unconcealment was not previously present, but was previously being. What Heidegger 
has put forward is the way in which something is shown to be true. The Greeks have 
the word aletheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas. We say truth 
and usually understand it as correctness of representation (QCT, 318). The quest for 
understanding the proper realm of instrumentality has led us to truth through causality. 
This is very relevant since the definition of technology as instrumentality was only 
correct, but it did not hit at the true essence of technology. Yet if the path to truth is this 
revealing bringing-forth out of concealment into unconcealment, then perhaps the 
essence of technology must be unconcealed. 
It is at this point in the essay that Heidegger steers his discussion of revealing 
back towards relevance for the question of technology itself. Instrumentality is 
considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step 
into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at 
revealing Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing 
(QCT, 318). Heideggers method of questioning, now follows on in this way. What is 
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being asked is the question concerning technology, what is being interrogated is the 
concept of technology as means, and what is being pursued is the essence of technology 
itself.  
Heidegger properly returns to language itself for a further inquiry into the 
essence of technology. He studies the etymology of the Greek word techne and points 
out two significant ideas: 
One is that techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs to 
bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poetic. The other thing that we should 
observe with regard to techne is even more important. From earliest times until 
Plato the word techne is linked with the word episteme (QCT, 318).  
 
The meaning of the Greek word that technology is based on, techne, is closely linked 
with the concepts of making and knowing. This making involves not only technical 
construction, but art and poetry as well. Heidegger properly understands art as a 
revealing, as that which unconceals the concealed truth. Catherine Botha explains this 
significance in these terms. For the Greeks, technē meant a revelation of something, an 
uncovering or a bringing-forth (Heidegger, 1993:319). According to Heidegger the word 
technē, then, means a mode of knowing.30 The most proper sense of understanding 
techne is in its link to episteme.  Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial 
chalice reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the terms of the four modes of 
occasioningIt is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is a bringing 
forth (QCT, 319). The four modes of occasioning refer to the four modes of causality, 
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and indeed all causality is a bringing forth of what was previously concealed. All 
manufacturing is more properly understood as a revealing, and what is being revealed is 
the truth, the aletheia. Thus the essence of technology is that technology is a revealing. It 
is that which reveals and unconceals the true essence of an entity.  
The question at stake is whether or not modern technology, based on exact 
science, can also be said to be a revealing. Heidegger maintains that modern technology 
is indeed just such a revealing, but it is a revealing of a unique kind: 
And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not 
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in 
modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as 
such (QCT, 320).  
Even modern technology reveals what a thing is, but its revelation takes place through a 
kind of violence. The main difference between ancient and modern technology lies in 
how modern technology reveals the world as resource. Heidegger explains that this act 
of challenging can be called a setting-upon nature. This setting-upon that challenges the 
energies of nature is an expediting, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and 
exposes. Yet that expediting is always directed from the beginning towards furthering 
something else, i.e. toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense 
(QCT, 321). Modern technology reveals the world as resource, and it also sets upon the 
entities in the world in order to extract those resources. These resources have no inherent 
purpose, but rather they only exist to further the process of resource gathering and 
storage.  
The example that Heidegger uses is that of coal, but perhaps gasoline is a more 
immediate example in this age. In Heideggers terms oil is set upon and extracted from 
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the ground; not for its own sake, but only so it can be refined into petroleum. Petroleum 
is not refined for its own sake, but only so it can be stored as gasoline. Gasoline is stored 
up in order to be pumped into vehicles, and vehicles store gasoline in their tanks so that 
they might burn it for transportation. Transportation serves the purpose of getting people 
to and from their jobs, even jobs like working at an oil refinery. Such challenging 
happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is 
transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, 
and what is distributed is switched about ever anew (QCT, 322). Modern technology 
reveals the entities in the world as resources, and indeed it will only allow them to exist 
as resources.  
Modern technology reveals the being of all entities as purely functional. 
Heidegger has a particular phrase for the revealing of entities as resources. He calls it the 
standing-reserve, Bestand (QCT, 322). The logical response might be this: Surely this is 
simply a human action driven by human will? The question is almost as defensive as it 
is reflexive and this is a puzzle that Heidegger turns his attention to: 
Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the 
energies of nature can this revealing that orders happenyet precisely because 
man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the 
process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standingreserve. Since 
man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing 
(QCT, 323-324).  
 
The urge to count humanity amongst the standing reserve is strong, but they participate 
in the ordering of the world in such a way as to resist this. Although they drive the 
ordering, they are not its authors. The essence of modern technology extends even 
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beyond the human will to master it. The pertinent question can now be seen as, What is 
the true essence of modern technology, and how can this relate to humanity? 
3.4 Enframing 
In order to explain the essence of modern technology as a mode of revealing that 
challenges forth, Heidegger will have to make a new use of a common German word. 
Heidegger first explains that what brings man into a relation with the world, such that he 
is ordering it as standing reserve, is best understood as a gathering. That original 
gathering from which unfold the ways in which we have feelings of one kind or another 
we name Gemüt [disposition] (QCT, 324). The gathering is that which motivates the 
being of entities in one-way or another. It is that which is responsible for how entities are 
as they are, in the way that they are. It is not an all-encompassing concept, and indeed 
there are different gatherings for different entities. The gathering is best understood as 
the work or act of the revelation of the being of entities. The gathering that Heidegger is 
most concerned with here is the kind of gathering that is responsible for how humanity 
orders the standing reserve. We now name the challenging claim that gathers man with 
a view to ordering the self-revealing as standing reserve: Ge-stell [enframing] (QCT, 
324). His next move is to explain that he is using the German word for skeleton or 
frame, Gestell, in a thoroughly new context in this essay. He makes his apologies to the 
German language while explaining that this is a philosophical practice dating back to 
Platos revolutionary use of eidos as idea (QCT, 325).  
Heideggers use of this word enframing warrants a definition, and it is one which 
he is willing to provide. Enframing means the gathering together of the setting-upon 
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that sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of 
ordering, as standing reserve. Enframing means the way of revealing that holds sway in 
the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological (QCT, 325) 
The enframing is not machines and it is not technological, it is rather the true essence of 
technology. The enframing is the gathering that reveals the being of man, in this 
technological age, as the being who orders the entities of the world as standing reserve. 
It is what reveals the being of man as orderer, and in turn reveals the other entities of the 
world as ordered. Enframing is the mode of revealing that holds sway, that is to say it is 
the mode that is chief and unassailable in the essence of modern technology. It is also 
significant to point out that the enframing reveals itself as truth, as aletheia (QCT, 326). 
From Heideggers perspective, enframing is the way in which truth reveals itself as 
standing-reserve.31 As Godzinski points out, the truth of the enframing is that things 
exist as standing-reserve. This may seem to be abhorrent, but it is nonetheless a 
revealing of the being of entities in the way that they truly are. The nature of truth was 
elaborated in a lecture that Heidegger gave in the early 1920s. The lecture was entitled 
Being-Here and Being-True, and Theodore Kisiel elaborates on this Heideggerian 
notion of truth as unconcealment while commenting on that essay: 
If truth is a disclosive letting-see-and-be-seen, we then have a threefold sense of 
truth here: a) disclosure of a being by way of prevalent views of it, which include 
something already seen in them; b) disclosive entry into hitherto unknown 
domains of being; c) constant struggle with the chatter which gives itself out to 
be disclosive and knowing. In all three cases disclosure is a human affair, a basic 
comportment of Dasein.32 
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Kisiel shows that truth is always related to humanity, and thus the truth of the essence of 
technology must also be related.  The three ways of disclosing also mirror Heideggers 
notion of questioning, and therefore truth is also shown to be a disclosure that takes 
place through questions. The question of the essence of technology must now be viewed 
in light of its relation to humanity. 
Heidegger explains that the purpose of this line of questioning has been to 
discover not only the essence of modern technology, but also its significance and 
relation for humanity. Since the essence of modern technology is the enframing, then 
what remains to be asked is how does this relate to humanity? It is nothing 
technological, nothing on the order of the machine. It is the way in which the actual 
reveals itself as standing reserve. Again we ask : Does such revealing happen 
somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But neither does it happen exclusively in man, 
or definitively through man (QCT, 329). The unique aspect of our relationship to the 
enframing is that humanity is always already under the sway of the enframing. It is the 
revealing force of our world and we cannot separate ourselves from it.  
The enframing not only reveals our world, through us, as standing reserve, but it 
also reveals history itself in the same way. Heidegger explains that the enframing sends 
humanity on the way of revealing entities as standing reserve in the form of a destining, 
Geschick. It is from this destining that the essence of all history [Geschichte] is 
determined (QCT, 329). This destining is what the enframing is as much as it is also 
what the enframing does. The destining sets upon man, and it challenges him to reveal 
everything in every way as standing reserve. This is even true of history, since the 
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destining reveals history as something chronological, to be contained in records for 
future study or use. The enframing drives humanity, and it motivates humanity to act and 
challenge forth the world as standing reserve.  
It is in the notion of destining that Heidegger finds some hope. But that 
destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he 
belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who 
simply obeys (QCT, 330). The destining is powerful, but it is not strictly determinate. 
Even as it sends man on his way, it also frees him up to certain possibilities. Albert 
Borgmann explains destiny in simple terms when he writes, Destiny is neither an 
inevitable fate that descends on humanity, as Heidegger claims, nor the result of human 
willing. Disclosure of destiny and human freedom are one and the same.33 Humanity is 
destined but also free, and before this idea can become too confusing Heidegger explains 
freedom. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing 
shimmers the veil that hides the essential occurrence of all truth and lets the veil appear 
as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a 
revealing on its way (QCT, 330).  
Destining is always a destining of revealing truth, of revealing the way in which 
things actually are. The enframing as the destining of the age of technology is a 
revelation of being itself. The enframing holds sway in such a manner as to destine 
humanity to reveal all entities as standing reserve. Botha explains just what the destining 
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of technology is revealing. In this context technology is neither neutral nor 
instrumental. It signifies, for Heidegger, a particular mode of disclosure. In other words 
it reveals Being in a particular way.34 The enframing as the destining of the age of 
technology is a revelation of being itself. The enframing holds sway in such a manner as 
to destine humanity to reveal all entities as standing reserve. The enframing is the 
revelation of the being of entities, since that the entities are, and what the entities are, is 
unconcealed as standing reserve. Yet the enframing itself, as the destining of this age, is 
also being itself as it is transformed in this present age. Being, Heidegger found, 
changes through history and from the ground up, beginning in pre-Socratic Greece, it 
passed through various epochs to take its present shape as the framework of 
technology.35 Every revelation of what is concealed is a revelation of what is being 
concealed, that is to say of what an entity is being. The unconcealment of any entity as 
standing-reserve reveals that entity as functional, as being in the sense that Carman 
denoted with the term Zuhandenheit.36 In the technological age any entity is being 
available as resource for use and that is how its being is revealed under the revealing 
sway of the enframing.  
Yet what reveals the being of an entity, is Being itself. That is why Heidegger 
first chose the path to being through Dasein, and why in turn he chose the path to the 
essence of technology through instrumentum, the common understanding of the essence 
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of technology. The enframing as the mode of revelation and the destining power of this 
age, is being itself as the destining power of this age. To understand this is to understand 
precisely why the enframing is significant. [W]hen we once open ourselves expressly to 
the essence of technology we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim 
(QCT, 330-331). To encounter the enframing as the enframing, to recognize it as such, is 
to recognize being itself, and that is no small achievement. Despite the joy of this 
revelation, this understanding of being also brings to light the greatest threat that the 
enframing poses. 
The threat of the enframing is not simply machines that threaten life or health, 
but something far more sinister: 
The essence of technology lies in enframing. Its holding sway belongs within 
destining. Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, 
man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of 
pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of 
deriving all his standards on this basis (QCT, 331).  
 
The enframing destines humanity in such a way that the only revealing of truth open to 
them is the ordering of the entities in the world as standing reserve. This way of 
revealing opens up only its singular path; while at the same time closing off all other 
avenues of revealing: 
The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore 
necessarily, danger. In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, 
the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time 
harbors the danger, that man may misconstrue the unconcealed and misinterpret 
itThe destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger 
(QCT, 331). 
 
The threat is a danger, and it is what Heidegger construes as the danger. The threat of 
misinterpretation of the being of an entity, due to the notion that one is taken up with the 
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destining of the age, has always been the threat in any mode of revealing. It is far too 
simple to let oneself be carried away in the spirit of an age, and in so thinking to be 
absorbed into that spirit.  
However just as modern technology is different from ancient technology, the 
enframing is a revealing that is different from all other modes of revealing as well. Yet 
when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme danger (QCT, 332). 
The enframing has a special danger associated with it in the sense that it transcends all 
other modes of revealing as the supreme danger. Heidegger explains that this is the case 
for two very chilling reasons. If every entity makes an appearance as only standing 
reserve then man himself will come to be ordered as standing reserve. Botha further 
explains this threat when she says, The horror of the technological age is that human 
beings are also seen as raw material. Thus the question concerning technology is 
ultimately a question about human dignity.37 It is not only our dignity that is at stake, 
but in a unique way our humanity itself: 
Meanwhile, man precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures 
as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man 
encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn 
to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters 
himself (QCT, 332).  
 
Humanity never truly encounters its own essence, since it only ever encounters its false 
essence as the solipsistic lord of the standing reserve. The further threat of the enframing 
as the supreme danger is that it limits entirely what modes of being that may be revealed 
by and to humanity. With the enframing, the spirit of the age is not just nearsighted, it is 
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almost blind. Only as standing reserve can the being of any entity be revealed, and this 
denies any other mode of revealing. Even beyond this it denies revealing itself, since it 
will not reveal any mode of revelation as a mode of revelation, but only as a resource to 
be used.  
Thus, Heidegger explains that the danger of technology is not from the machines 
of war, or from any destruction that it creates. The rule of enframing threatens man with 
the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and 
hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus where the enframing reigns, 
there is a danger in the highest sense. It is in the face of the great threat of the enframing 
that Heidegger sees fit to quote some lines of poetry from Friedrich Hölderlin. But 
where danger is, grows the saving power also (QCT, 332). In the face of danger 
Heidegger alludes to hope in the form of a saving power. This discussion now comes to 
the saving power, and the end of chapter II. Though Heidegger does make many key 
points regarding this power in what remains of the QCT, he makes a far more eloquent 
case in his work The Turning. The time has now come to address the saving power, and 
its significance for being as it appears in The Turning. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TURNING AFTER THE SPIRITUAL 
4.1 Introduction 
In many ways The Turning is a complimentary essay to the Question Concerning 
Technology. It was originally written at about the same time as the first draft of the QCT, 
and it elaborates on a key point made near the end of QCT. If it can be said that the 
Question reveals the danger, then the Turning reveals the saving power. In the fourth 
chapter of this thesis, The Turning will be examined in detail.  
Quite a bit has been said about the nature of being and the supreme threat posed 
by the essence of technology as enframing. The enframing is being as it is revealed in 
this age, or as it is destined, and this sheds light on the supreme danger of the enframing. 
The danger is that being itself might be entirely closed off from humanity, and that it 
may only be revealed in the form of the enframing. It is in The Turning that Heidegger 
outlines the answer to this problem in the form of a saving power. Even though both 
essays touch on similar themes, the primary point where both essays converge can be 
found in Heideggers treatment of enframing [Gestell].38 The turn in the Turning is the 
revelation that the danger and the saving power are one and the same. This chapter will 
proceed to analyze the saving power, attempt to explain Heideggers answer to the 
dangers of technology, and examine an original interpretation of Heideggers idea of 
God. 
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4.2 Turning 
To that end this chapter now opens with beginning of the Turning, and the 
reassessment of the supreme danger. The Turning opens with a redefinition of the 
enframing, and a reintroduction of the danger that the enframing poses. The essence of 
Enframing is that setting-upon gathered into itself which entraps the truth of its own 
coming to presence with oblivion. This entrapping disguises itself, in that it develops 
into the setting in order of everything that presences as standing-reserve39 Godzinksi 
represents this as a dual move. He (Heidegger) maintains that a double movement of 
concealment can be observed within the overall movement of enframing.40 The 
enframing conceals its true nature as being, by revealing itself as that which orders the 
standing reserve. It also conceals its nature as the ordering of the standing reserve by 
revealing itself as technology, that is as the instrument and tool of humanity. Heidegger 
explains that the supreme danger is the concealing and disguising of being in the form of 
the dual concealment of the enframing. The enframing only reveals itself as 
instrumentum, the tool for humanitys mastery over the earth. But in truth, it is the 
coming to presence of man that is now being ordered forth to lend a hand to the coming 
to presence of technology (Turn, 37). It seems that humanity is utterly lost, deceived by 
the very forces they believe themselves to control. Yet Heidegger does not take this as 
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an opportunity for pessimism, for it is in this realization that he makes a new discovery 
about being.  
The enframing has a certain temporal quality to it, and the greater realization that 
this yields is that being has this same quality: 
If Enframing is a destining of the coming to presence of Being itself, then we 
may venture to suppose that Enframing, as one among Beings modes of coming 
to presence changes.That which has the character of destining moves, in itself, 
at any given time, toward a special moment that sends it into another destining, 
in which, however, it is not simply submerged and lost (Turn, 37). 
 
Heidegger returns to the notion of destining as he seeks to explain the temporal aspect of 
the enframing. Mans coming to presence is being ordered to cause technology to come 
to presence. Technology as the enframing is also coming to presence in the form of the 
destining of being in this age, but each destining is always moving towards a new 
destining. The enframing is coming, but it is also going into the veil of history to join 
every destining of being that has come before. This realization gives the hope that the 
enframing is changing and it is changing into something else.  
It is not destroyed by what it is changing into, since that does not fit the nature of 
destining. But destining is essentially destining of Being, indeed in such a way that 
Being itself takes place so as to adapt itself, and ever comes to presence as a destining 
and, accordingly changes in the manner of a destining (Turn, 38). Since every destining 
is a destining of being itself, history is not a tale of the obliteration of all past destinies. It 
is important for Heidegger to point out that the destining of being is not constantly 
dying, but rather it is growing and changing. What is changing is the revelation of being 
in a certain age, rather than being itself. It is important for Heidegger to preserve the 
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oneness of being. For what gives destining its character as destining is that it takes 
place so as suitably to adapt itself to the ordaining that is ever one (Turn, 37). There is 
something strange at work in the flux and stability of being, but it is not one or the other, 
it is both. This realization of the permanence of being illuminates a feature of the 
enframing as well, namely its indestructible nature. 
The situation now appears to be more dire, for if the enframing cannot be 
destroyed, then how can any other destining of being ever come to hold sway? While it 
is true that every destining of being is always on the way to a new destining, the supreme 
danger of the enframing seems to act against this. Since the danger is that being will 
forever be concealed, this creates the result that being is revealed only as the enframing. 
If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger within 
Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mastered (Turn, 
37). The enframing is being, and unless humanity is the master of being they cannot 
master the enframing. So it seems that humanity is still being delivered over to the 
enframing. Out of this understanding of the enframing Heidegger returns to a 
consideration of humanitys essence and its connection to being.  
Humanity will understand its essence when that essence is revealed in 
Humanitys coming to presence. Our coming to presence is deeply connected with the 
coming to presence of being, and a new destining of being cannot come to pass, without 
the cooperation of the coming to presence of man (Turn, 39). This is vital, for as much 
as humanity is being ordered by the enframing we may still defeat the enframing through 
a deeper connection to being. Heidegger points out that this defeat will not be an act of 
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overcoming, but of surmounting. In the German, technology will not be überwunden, but 
rather it will be verwunden. This verwunden surmounting will bring a new destining of 
being that restores being into truth. This truth will not be the dual concealment of the 
enframing, but rather an authentic concealment of being itself as itself. This restoring 
surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief or 
pain (Turn, 39). Heideggers analogy is stunning in what it reveals about the vital role 
of humanity in the changing destiny of the ages. When one ends the grieving process for 
a lost loved one, the dead still remain dead. The loss still exists, but grief ends when that 
loss becomes incorporated into a life as part of the whole of that life. The loss is no 
longer sharp or acute, and it is no longer actively felt. In some ways it always remains 
present, transformed from that which brings pain into that which gives strength.  
In a similar way this surmounting process is what humanity is involved in doing 
with and for being. Man is indeed needed and used for the restorative surmounting of 
the essence of technology. But man is used here in his essence that corresponds to that 
surmounting (Turn, 39). Humanity is essential to the surmounting of the destining of 
being as the enframing, but it would be wrong to say that humanity is instrumental in 
this surmounting. It is not use in the way that the enframing uses standing-reserve, but 
instead it is cooperation. Before this surmounting takes place humanity must become 
open to the true essence of technology as being. However, in order that man in his 
essence may become attentive to the essence of technology, and in order that there may 
be founded an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their 
essence, modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of 
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the space proper to his essence (Turn, 39). This is what Heidegger means by humanity 
being used in the surmounting of the enframing. We must cooperate with the enframing 
in the bringing about of a new destining, and thereby in the coming to presence of being. 
Humanity cooperates by seeking the coming to presence of the essence of humanity, and 
in the revealing of the essence of humanity there happens place the revealing of a freeing 
destining of being. Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper 
to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything 
essential within the destining now holding sway (Turn, 39-40). Heidegger has returned 
to the path of Dasein, as he is seeking to understand the surmounting of the enframing.  
Heidegger is concerned with understanding the essence of humanity and its 
connection to the essence of being. Before the essence of humanity can be grasped the 
essence of being must be questioned. So Heidegger has come to that most troubling of 
questions that must always precede any project, the question concerning action. All this 
we can do only if, before considering the question that is seemingly always the most 
immediate one and the only urgent one, What shall we do? We ponder this: How must 
we think (Turn, 37)? The realization is that the act of thinking is action, and it is the 
action that must be taken if the essence of humanity is to be understood. In addition one 
realizes that questioning about being cannot begin until thinking is questioned. This very 
act of questioning thinking reveals the correspondence that is needed for humanitys 
coming to presence with the coming to presence of being. John Caputo explains that the 
move of correspondence is the move of cooperation. The great being of man lies in 
his cooperation with Being in bringing Being into its truth. Dasein cooperates with 
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Being by letting Being be.41 This correspondence, that is a cooperation, is yielded 
through the veil of language:  
Language is the primal dimension within which mans essence is first able to 
correspond at all to Being and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to 
Being. This primal corresponding, expressly carried out is thinking. Through 
thinking we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to pass the 
restorative surmounting of the destining of Being, the surmounting of Enframing 
(Turn, 41).  
 
It is thinking that is the act of surmounting, and it is in thinking that the way to surmount 
the enframing is revealed in a turning.  
The advent of the turning is now revealed and the enframing as the danger is 
turned in upon itself into the saving power. The enframing first appears as the danger in 
that it turns away from the truth of being and conceals that truth into oblivion. The 
danger reveals itself in the dual concealment of its true nature: first as instrument and 
second as enframing. The possibility of the surmounting this danger lies in the 
unconcealing of the dual concealment of the enframing. In the coming to presence of 
the danger there conceals itself, therefore, the possibility of a turning in which the 
oblivion belonging to the coming to presence of Being will so turn itself that, with this 
turning, the truth of the coming to presence of Being will expressly turn in turn 
homeward into whatever is (Turn, 41). This turning of the danger into that which 
actually safeguards the coming to presence of being initially seems quite elusive. How is 
it that the danger, in concealing itself, is actually safeguarding being itself, and in so 
doing making way for the surmounting of the enframing?  
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Heidegger says that this surmounting can only happen after the danger is 
revealed, and this revelation is a destining of being that remains in doubt. It is this 
unknown factor that shows humanity for what they are in their correspondence to being. 
[B]ecause his essence is to be the one who waits, the one who attends upon the coming 
to presence of Being in that in thinking he guards it (Turn, 42). Humanity is the safe 
keeper of being, and it is in thinking that they guard the concealed truth of being. 
Godzinksi explains that this act of concealment, as native to the enframing and being 
itself, is needed before any revelation can happen. Being conceals itself in order to 
presence. Similarly nothing would be able to come to presence without this concealment. 
In the process of presencing or coming to be, things necessarily conceal themselves.42 
The safeguarding action is one of concealing being into its truth. This act requires 
patience, in that being is concealed and guarded, so that it might also be revealed. The 
essence of humanity is tied to shepherding being, and waiting patiently upon being to 
reveal itself. Thus humanity waits patiently for the danger to be unconcealed as the 
danger.  
This is where the turning takes place at last, for it is in this unconcealment of the 
danger as danger that the saving power is revealed. Heidegger quotes Hölderlin as he 
explains the turning revealing of the saving power in the danger:  
Where the danger is as the danger, there the saving power is already thriving 
also. The latter does not appear incidentally. The saving power is not secondary 
to the danger. The self-same danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving 
power. The danger is the saving power, inasmuch as it brings the saving power 
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out of its  the dangers  concealed essence that is ever susceptible of turning 
(Turn, 42).  
 
The turning takes place when the truth of being is safeguarded and the surmounting of 
the enframing happens. The turning begins when the danger is revealed as danger, but 
this also has the most curious effect. When the danger is so revealed it is not the danger 
at all, for it is thusly revealed as the saving power. The saving power is the 
unconcealment of the enframing as that which threatens to conceal being itself into 
oblivion. This saving is that power that brings being back out of the concealment of the 
enframing and into its own authentic truth. Against this saving the supreme danger is 
that being will be concealed in the dual concealment of the enframing, and that its 
coming to presence will be denied:  
When accordingly, the danger is as the danger, then the entrapping that is the 
way Being itself entraps its truth with oblivion comes expressly to pass. When 
this entrapping-with-oblivion does come expressly to pass, then oblivion as such 
turns in and abidesWith such in-turning, the oblivion relating to Beings 
safekeeping is no longer the oblivion of Being; but rather, turning in thus, it turns 
about into the safekeeping of Being.world comes to pass. That world comes to 
pass as world, that the thing things, this is the distant advent of the coming to 
presence of Being itself (Turn, 43). 
 
This is the turning, the surmounting of the enframing, and the coming to presence of 
being as being. The world itself comes to pass in this turning, and the power of the 
enframing is surmounted into a new destining of being. When the enframing is revealed 
as the danger it becomes the saving power. In that move it reveals, not the standing 
reserve, but being itself. It reveals the truth that the enframing is the destining of being in 
this age. In that revelation the enframing reaches the apex of its power and it becomes 
surmounted by an as yet concealed destining of being. Patricia Johnson summarizes this 
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move in the following manner. We recognize that in the course of human history, the 
way in which Being has been understood has changedThis change in frameworks is 
experienced as something given, not something manufactured or achieved. This 
understanding is the saving power.43 Now if this is when the turning comes to pass, 
there is still the question of how the turning comes to pass. What causes the danger to be 
revealed as the danger? Surely if the enframing is being itself concealing itself into 
oblivion, then humanity would remain forever ignorant of it. How then does the turning 
come to pass? 
 Heidegger wants to make it clear that the turning comes to pass on its own, and is 
only revealed through what he calls insight.  
When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen only without 
mediation. For Being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by anything, 
nor does it itself bring anything aboutSheerly, out of its own essence of 
concealedness, Being brings itself to pass into its epoch. Therefore we must pay 
heed (Turn, 44).  
 
The turning happens in its own time as being has destined itself to turn. No human hand 
can force it, and no natural will can bend it. The turning happens through its own 
devices, and though the correspondence of humanity is needed for surmounting, it is not 
within our control. The revelation of the essence of humanity happens in the same way 
that the essence of technology is revealed, through the changing destining of being. That 
is why humanity only corresponds in its essence to the essence of being.  
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What Heidegger is attempting to make clear is that the turning happens suddenly, 
and it is revealed in the same way that it happens. Heidegger uses the words Einblick, 
and Einblitz to explain this process. The in-turning [Einkehr] that is the lightning flash 
of the truth of Being is the entering flashing glance  insight [Einblick]When oblivion 
turns about, when world as the safekeeping of the coming to presence of Being turns in, 
then there comes to pass the in-flashing [Einblitz] (Turn, 45). The idea is that being 
makes its appearance known very loudly but also very quickly. Being discloses itself in 
the flash, but even the sight to behold the flash belongs to being as well. This flashing 
light of being also reveals the essence of humanity. Insight into that which is  thus do 
we name the sudden flash of the truth of Being into truth less Being. When insight 
comes disclosingly to pass, then men are the ones who are struck in their essence by the 
flashing of Being. In insight, men are the one who are caught sight of (Turn, 47). When 
the lightning flash of being reveals itself, what it is revealing is the truth of Dasein. It is 
revealing the essence of humanity corresponding to the essence of being. Humanity is 
revealed and being itself opens up the world to humanity. 
4.3 Dangers 
 There now reigns in this philosophy of technology the most peculiar passivity to 
the myriad dangers of technology. It still seems necessary to question this turning that 
Heidegger has presented to the danger of technology. In this modern age Heidegger 
seems correct in his assessment of the world as technological. Everywhere, and in every 
way, machines and technology direct the course of our human existence. It now 
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behooves us to revisit the problem of technology, not as the supreme danger, but as the 
lesser dangers.  
It is no secret to anyone that technological devices are extremely prevalent in the 
western world. It would seem strange to go through the day without encountering some 
technological device. Despite that, it is not so strange to go through a day without 
encountering any natural object. In general our clothes, food, water, and even our 
recycled air are all technologies. We live in a world where many of the things we 
interact with on a daily basis are artificial. Sometimes it seems that the only non-
technological devices in our world are ourselves.  
In the face of a technological world the four areas of technological influence and 
interference that Dias outlined in chapter I spring readily to mind (Dias, 392). In his first 
category he outlined machines that may do us direct and irreversible physical harm. The 
nuclear weapon remains one of the most striking example of such a machine. Dias 
second category is that of the tendency of technology to promote injustice (Dias, 393). 
An insidious use of machines and resources seems to reveal the polarization of classes 
based on technology. New class structures are being established around the 
technologically savvy, and the technologically ignorant. Dias third category is that 
technology has profound sociological impacts (Dias, 393). One need only look at the 
highway system in America to understand the impact technology can have on how 
society is formed. An authentic sense of community can be lost when community 
becomes another resource to be accessed on the end of a long drive. Despite these 
examples the most troubling category is Dias last, that of the psychological (Dias, 393). 
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Technology changes humanity itself from the inside out. Devices like the digital clock 
have altered our perceptions of time. Life can be divided out into discrete, separable, and 
infinitely reducible segments.  
In the face of the problems that technologies create does Heideggers solution 
really help? How can a passive waiting for a turning deliver humanity from the threat of 
nuclear weapons, the constant pull of a cell phone, or the distancing nature of 
transportational technology? Some critics have reached the conclusion that it cant. In 
fact much of the criticism of Heideggers answer to the danger of technology hinges on 
the distinction between technology itself, and the particular technologies. 
Andrew Feenberg is more than adequate as a representative of one main criticism 
of Heideggers philosophy of technology. Feenberg posits that a certain defeatist spirit is 
motivating Heideggers answer. Apparently Heidegger has dismissed any sense of a 
solution calling for action in light of certain failures of his age. [T]here was a time in 
his life when Heidegger was not so fatalistic, when he held out the hope of a radical 
change. Unfortunately this hope was linked with Nazism, the failure of which Heidegger 
himself eventually recognized.44 Feenberg puts forth the notion that this failure caused 
Heidegger to adopt a fatalistic and inactive philosophy of technology. He claims that 
Heideggers final solution is weakened by this attitude of fatalism, and by an inability to 
deal with particular technologies. Even if the mode of revealing were to shift away 
from the technological enframing, it seems as though we would still be using the same 
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deviceshe did not apply his thought to actual devices, just to our attitude toward them 
and toward nature.45 For Feenberg, Heidegger does not go far enough. Though 
Heideggers philosophy of technology may be interesting, it does not adequately deal 
with the problems at hand.  
Feenberg is almost convinced that even if the new destining of being were to 
come; humanity would continue to challenge forth the world as standing reserve. Since 
much of Feenbergs critique of Heidegger concerns the distinction between 
technological devices and technology itself,   Feenberg seems to agree with Ihdes 
criticism. That is, Heideggers philosophy of technology is weakened by its 
inapplicability, and its abstract metaphysical nature (Ihde, 385). Rather than viewing this 
move as sinister, in an act of sympathy Feenberg sees only defeat in Heideggers 
writings. It seems to me that Heidegger was himself far more deeply touched by 
modern nihilism than Thomson is willing to concede, far more so than Dreyfus. Nothing 
in his world escaped the enframing sufficiently to constitute a new god.46 Feenberg 
gives a rather bleak assessment of Heideggers philosophy of technology. It seems that 
he is arguing that Heideggers proposed solution cannot succeed, and perhaps it was 
never meant to. No turning ever seems to have taken place for Heidegger, and perhaps 
no turning ever will as long as technology is still in use.  
Before one can determine if Heidegger had an adequate answer to these 
accusations a new problem has arisen. The question raised is, can a turning ever take 
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place, or does the enframing hold an unassailable sway? The essence of being is 
concealed into oblivion by the enframing, and it does not seem as though any turning is 
possible. Despite this Heidegger seems to hold out hope that the saving power has not 
been defeated, and it may be closer than ever if one is able to see the in-flashing of 
being. Being may reveal that a new destining of revealing already surmounts the 
enframing. If one has the insight to see what is already available in Heideggers words 
then the turning may be revealed. Perhaps the meaning of the surmounting can be 
displayed in the understanding of one of the simplest of Heideggers words, nach. 
4.4 Revealing the Power 
The title of The Question Concerning Technology, is an English translation of the 
original German title Die Frage nach der Technik.47 A very rough translation of the 
German might read like this, The question that is being asked after the technical. Such 
a translation does not encapsulate the theme of the essay, and it ignores many deep 
Heideggerian concerns. The common translation in English-Heideggerian scholarship, 
The Question Concerning Technology, is quite adequate. It seems that humanity is the 
questioner, but the technical is not what is being interrogated. Rather the essay is about 
the technical itself, technology itself, but not merely as a substance. The question 
concerns technology and indeed, it is a concern for technology, perhaps in the same way 
that Dasein is concerned for being.48 Yet if the meaning of the arrival of Heideggers 
turning is to be understood, then perhaps it can be illuminated in that rough translation. 
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If the question can be understood as an asking after technology, then perhaps being 
itself may become illuminated. Please be aware that this is not an attempt to reinterpret 
or misinterpret Heidegger. It is an effort to show the strength of the German language in 
revealing the truth of Heideggers words. The critical word for this understanding is the 
simple German preposition nach.  
As it is simply translated the word nach means after.49 This sense of after is the 
one often used in expressing the time, such as a quarter after two. A simpler meaning 
might be something like sequence, that which follows after. It is a word of transition, 
and to understand it in this way reveals the saving power present in the very title of 
Heideggers essay. In this light the question in the title is the question that comes after 
technology, and it is the question that follows upon technology. What is the nature of the 
question itself? The question must be that which Heidegger elaborates within the essay, 
We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is (QCT, 312). 
Technology, in its essence, is the enframing, the dual concealment of being in the guise 
of that which challenges forth the world into standing reserve. The title now becomes the 
question that is being asked after technology has been revealed for what it is. This fits 
the notion of Heideggerian questioning quite well, as technology is being asked about, 
but it cannot be asked until it is in some way known.50   
If the question about what technology is, is being asked after one knows the 
answer, then this might mean one of two things. Either the answer is the common 
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answer, that technology is instrumentum, or it is something else entirely. The very work 
of QCT reveals that the answer is in fact not instrument but enframing. If this is the 
question that is being asked after technology is known to be the enframing, then here is 
the turning itself expressed already in Heideggers title. When the danger is as the 
danger, with the turning about of oblivion, the safekeeping of being comes to pass; 
world comes to pass (Turn, 43). When the danger of the enframing is revealed for what 
it is, then the turning comes to pass. If the enframing holds true sway then all is revealed 
as standing reserve. Yet if the question is being asked, then it means something 
powerful, that the turning is already happening. Without the turning, being would remain 
hidden, and the question asking after technology would only yield the instrumental 
answer.  
If the turning has happened then the question that follows technology is the 
question that is motivated by the enframing itself. It is brought to light by the revelation 
of the danger as the danger, and thus it can only come to be asked after technology is 
truly revealed. The dual concealment is no longer entirely at work, and the enframing 
has been revealed through the cracks in its facade. The power of this translational 
understanding is that it can reveal the truth of the turning in the asking of the question. 
The question no longer is can the turning be at all? but how can the turning be here 
already active in our world? 
The mystery of the turning already active in the world is contained in the mystery 
of the revelation of being itself. Being is not mediated, and if Heideggers words are to 
convey meaning then being as both technology and deliverance from technology must 
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move to reveal itself. When the turning comes to pass in the danger, this can happen 
only without mediation. For Being has no equal whatever. It is not brought about by 
anything else nor does it itself bring anything about (Turn, 44). Being is not caused, nor 
does it produce effects, rather it is. The turning is not affected by being; it exists already 
present in being along with the enframing. Yet how can humanity behold this revelation?  
Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the insight by which he 
himself is beheld, renounces human self-will and projects himself toward that 
insight, away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that 
insight. In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], that he, 
within the safeguarded element of world, may, as the mortal, look out toward the 
divine. Otherwise not; for the god also is  when he is  a being and stands as a 
being within being and its coming to presence, which brings itself to pass out of 
the worlding of world (Turn, 47). 
 
This is the mystery of the turning, that in humanitys renouncement of will and action 
the turning comes to pass. When the turning passes and humanity is freed into its 
essence, then humanity is given to understand its place in the world. In the words that 
Heidegger has written above, that is a place where mortal, finite, humanity looks out 
towards the divine, to God. What is the meaning of Gods appearance for Heidegger? Is 
this being in another form, a return to Christianity, or something else entirely? It seems 
certain even now that if being leads humanity to God, then it leads us on a path that has 
yet to be understood fully. 
4.5 God 
 The question of how the turning can take place has now become embroiled in the 
question of God, and its meaning for Heidegger. In reference to the power of the 
enframing, and the danger of this age, Heidegger made a now famous statement in an 
interview. Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a 
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sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or for the 
absence of the god in the time of foundering (Untergang); for in the face of the god who 
is absent, we founder.51 While Dreyfus gave his humanistic interpretation of this 
statement in chapter I, he is not the only voice on the subject. Dreyfus thinks that 
Heideggers god is a new human practice that will impart meaning to the world. This 
does not seem to entirely grasp the total releasement of human self-will that Heidegger 
expresses in the end of the turning. Perhaps an understanding of this releasement could 
focus what Heidegger means in speaking of God.  
In the words of Botha, Heidegger is simply promoting patience as the expression 
of a reopening of humanity to thinking. He speaks of god not in some strict religious 
sense, but only to illustrate a need to appreciate the unknown. No all-powerful entity 
will redeem us. The moral, redemptive god is as dead for Heidegger as for 
NietzscheHe advocates a god-less thinking which abandons a metaphysically 
constructed God, a God that can be known as an object that subjects evaluate.52 Botha 
seems convinced that Heidegger is not looking for the deus ex machina, but rather he is 
seeking a new way of thinking. This way of thinking is the respect for the unknown, and 
it is Bothas understanding of the answer that Heidegger gives to the question of 
technology. To be released from human self will means to be released from the need for 
action, and into the mystery of the revealing truth that comes from thinking. Bothas 
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understanding of Heideggers move is much more traditionally philosophical, and the 
solution to the problem of technology comes in the form of quiet reflection. The turning 
will be realized when humanity sits down and thinks about it. Thomson echoes this 
sentiment in his own writings: 
Heideggers resacralization of the simple thing reminds us that the conditioned 
has roots in the unconditioned, the secular in the sacred, and thus suggest that we 
should adopt a very different attitude toward our world, a Grundstimmung much 
more reflective and thankful than the thorough-going instrumental reasoning 
characteristic of our technological mode of revealing.53  
 
This shares many of Heideggers sympathies on questioning and thinking. It is in 
thinking that the realization of the turning flashes before the eyes of the thinker.  
Yet something still remains mysterious, and that is the move of being. If one 
arrives at the turning through reflection, what makes the turning arrive at all? How is it 
that one is even brought to reflect on the turning? The question of how the turning can 
take place appears again, and with an even greater urgency. If thinking is the path to 
understanding the turning, then what starts us upon that path? What makes the path 
available at all? The answer may be contained within the mystery of the connection 
between God and being.  
The mystery of God and being is furthered by the connection that Heidegger 
draws for them in the end of The Turning. One of the concerns for many a thinker after 
Nietzsche regards the existence of God after his untimely death. Heidegger gives voice 
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to this concern at the end of The Turning, and in so doing sheds some light on the path 
that the turning takes:  
Whether the god lives or remains dead is not decided by the religiosity of men 
and even less by the theological aspirations of philosophy and natural science. 
Whether or not God is God comes disclosingly to pass from out of and within the 
constellation of Being. So long as we do not, through thinking, experience what 
is, we can never belong to what will be (Turn, 49).  
 
This is a mysterious interplay of words and meaning near the very end of Heideggers 
essay, but it is an issue of some deep concern for him, and the author of this thesis.  
One might make a classical theological move, and say that God is being. 
However, this would ignore many Heideggerian sympathies, and at best be a move of 
too much simplicity. John Caputo illustrates well the difference between being and God 
in an essay on Heidegger and Theology. Thinking is directed toward being, not God. 
Being is not God but the event of manifestness, the happening of the truth of being, the 
coming to pass of the history of the epochal manifestations of being  from the early 
Greeks to the will to power.54 Caputo understands that the destining character of being 
is what makes it quite different from the Christian conception of God. Yet if being is not 
the same as God, then what is the god in Heideggers philosophy of technology? Caputo 
admits that this is the source of much debate and conflict for Heidegger. Though he says 
that when Heidegger talks of the gods, or of The Fourfold he is speaking of a poetical 
deity. The Fourfold  earth and sky, mortals and gods  is a deeply Hölderlinian 
conception that Heidegger derived from his readings of Hölderlins poetizing of the 
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Greek world. So the god that emerges in Heideggers late writing is a profoundly poetic 
god55 While Caputo is very sympathetic towards any Christian leanings Heidegger 
might have, he simply does not see their expressed presence in Heideggers writings on 
technology.  
To be sure there are many sympathies which a Christian might share with 
Heidegger on the nature of technology and its danger for our world. However, 
Heideggers answer is not an overtly Christian one, and Heidegger does not seem to be 
advocating a turn to religion. What then has become of the turning and its connection to 
God and Being? How can the turning be happening and technologies still exist? How 
can the turning appear in this world at all? From whence comes the turning? It is this last 
question that now reveals an original and helpful way to understand God in Heideggers 
philosophy of technology. 
If the supreme danger, as the enframing, can be said to hold sway over this world 
then the mystery of the truth of being may always be denied. If the enframing holds 
power, then the danger will forever be concealed. Yet it is in the revelation of the turning 
that the danger appears as danger, and is surmounted by the saving power that bears 
humanity home into its essence. This comes to pass when the danger is revealed as the 
danger within the quiet reflection of thinking. One may still ask what leads us to think, 
and what leads us to this understanding? It could be that being itself is revealing itself to 
us, but it does this in such a way as to reveal the enframing as being. If this cannot be 
mediated, and we cannot arrive at it through our own will, then we must wait for its 
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appearance. We could not even see it unless when it flashed it also granted us the insight 
to view its flash (Turn, 47). Being reveals itself in a manner most mysterious. It creeps 
into our minds and causes us to ask the question concerning technology. It is not acting 
as an infiltrator, but it is already present within us. How can something that is present 
within us, reveals its nature to us, and bears a relationship of correspondence to us, be 
understood? The move towards the divine is astoundingly close.  
Here lies the mystery, that being behaves or acts, yet it is not a substance or 
creature. This line of thinking and questioning opens up a new path for understanding 
God through being in Heidegger. Being is, and yet it is not anything at all that we can 
understand. Being also frees us, the mortals, to look out toward the divine, and 
contemplate the coming of the God. Perhaps Bothas sympathies suit the situation best 
and Heidegger is calling for a respect for the unknown. Yet Dreyfus understood the 
change to be a radical altering of everything we once believed. Nietzsche wrote that God 
was dead in The Madman, and this has been understood to mean that people have lost 
faith in Him.56 For Heidegger, the being of God may come to be revealed out of the 
being of being. When will this come to pass, and in what destining will God be revealed 
at last? The destining is always unknown, and all that is certain is that each destining 
will be surmounted in turn. Perhaps this understanding of Heidegger may allow for the 
final destining of being to be a revealing of being as God himself. Perhaps if mankind is 
mortal then history might be too. Is it so inconceivable to think that if the enframing is 
being surmounted by the revelation of its being, then the new destining might be the 
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last? Heidegger was not closed off to the possibility of Gods revelation as God, but he 
was convinced that it would come only through the revelation of being. Surely also the 
attitude of the turning applies here as well. One must wait in the spirit of releasement, 
and be patient for the appearing of being. In thus corresponding man is gathered into 
his own [ge-eignet], that he within the safeguarded element of the world, may, as the 
mortal look out toward the divine (Turn, 47). It is a hard thing to grasp the power of 
patience, and of letting the mysterious remain unknown. However, if the truth of the 
turning can be understood, then the power of technology in this world is already 
breaking, and the coming of a new destining is at hand. 
It may come to pass that this new understanding of Heidegger may show God 
revealed as already active in this world in causing humanity to correspond in its essence 
to the essence of being. It may be that Gods will causes the revelation of being, and the 
revelation of humanitys essence as well. In light of this turning, the lesser dangers of 
technologies may come to pass away in much the same fashion as the supreme danger of 
technology itself. Thus while the danger reigns supreme, humanity may yet look out and 
behold the saving power in the revelation of God.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the primary aim of this thesis has been to show technology as the 
revelation of being in this age, in Heideggers philosophy. The thesis began with the 
question of what motivates Heidegger or anyone to reflect philosophically on 
technology? Through the works and words of Thomson, Ihde, Dias, and Dreyfus 
several influences were revealed.  
Thomson points out that the historical metaphysical influence of Nietzsche has 
been instrumental in creating the current technological worldview of the west. The 
influence of Kant motivated Heidegger to view the world as a projection of human 
thought and ideas through metaphysics. Heidegger is also reacting against Nietzsche, 
and Heidegger is attempting to combat the nihilism of this age. Ihde sees Heidegger as 
motivated by the philosophy of science that he absorbed from Husserl and the logical 
positivists of the early twentieth century. Heideggers philosophy of technology seems to 
be years ahead of its time, as it shows technologys precedence over science in 
technoscience. Ihde is ultimately frustrated by Heideggers supposed metaphysics, and 
Ihde claims that a more robust system would speak to the differences between 
technologies. It is Dias who finds the motivation for a philosophy of technology in 
technologies themselves. He divides all harmful technologies into four categories in an 
attempt to show a practical motivation for a philosophy of technology. The categories of 
the physically harmful, unjust, sociologically harmful, and psychologically harmful 
typify all manner of technological devices that cause even Heidegger to reflect on a 
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philosophy of technology. It is in the words of Dreyfus that Heideggers personal 
philosophical search for the understanding of being takes the forefront. Dreyfus explains 
that being, and its connection to technology, is the driving force behind Heideggers 
philosophy. Dreyfus also reveals a spiritual concern for the destiny of the west in 
Heideggers need for a god. Although he interprets this need as a sociological need for a 
new metaphysical grounding, Dreyfus opens up the path to revealing an original 
interpretation of Heideggers God through an understanding of being. 
The second movement in this thesis dealt with the idea of being and technology 
in Heideggers works. Through the aid of Taylor Carman, Theodore Kisiel, and the 
analysis of the introduction to Being and Time, a satisfactory definition of being was 
produced. An understanding of being is best attained through the understanding of being 
for a particular being, Dasein. Being is that which gives Dasein its form, function, 
existence, frame, and place in which to be. It is not simply the absolute grounding for 
things, but is in some sense the grounds for understanding the absolute. Invariably this 
understanding of being will prove significant for Heideggers understanding of 
technology as the thesis turns to the Question Concerning Technology.  
The QCT contains the bulk of Heideggers philosophy of technology, and yet it 
begins as a question. At the heart of QCT is the question of what is technology? 
Heidegger points out that the common understanding of technology is as instrument. 
Despite this understanding the question of what technology is seeks the essence of 
technology, and the essence of technology is enframing. The enframing causes all 
entities, and particular beings to be revealed as resources for use. The enframing is the 
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destining of being in this age, since it is being that reveals entities for what they are. 
Technology is being itself as the force in this age that causes all things to be revealed as 
resource. Humanity is deceived into thinking that they are the masters of technology 
when it truly masters them, since being is beyond human mastery. The supreme danger 
of technology lies in that it denies every revelation of an entities being except for the 
revelation of that being as resource. That the being of all entities is limited in this way 
cuts off the revelation of being itself as being, and causes humanity to lose sight of its 
own essence. Yet in this danger there is a turning that takes place. 
The final movement of the thesis begins with a discussion of Heideggers The 
Turning as it shows the path to answer the supreme danger of technology. While the 
enframing holds sway, it doubly conceals what it truly is. Technology conceals itself as 
instrument, and then conceals itself as the enframing, when its true identity is that of 
being itself as the destining of this age. The turning takes place when technology is 
revealed as being, and when it is so revealed the danger is surmounted by a saving 
power. Where technology is revealed as being, the danger of technology cutting off all 
revelations, except resource, is surmounted by the saving power that reveals being itself 
in technology. Though technology cannot be overcome by humanity it can be 
surmounted if humanity will cooperate with the enframing in revealing its true essence 
as being. In so doing humanity may once again uncover its true essence as the safe 
keepers of being.  
Though Heideggers philosophy addresses the danger of technology, some 
skepticism still persists regarding the lesser dangers. The four harmful kinds of 
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technologies that Dias raised are raised again as a threat that does not seem to be dealt 
with. Andrew Feenberg is referenced in his critique of Heideggers philosophy of 
technology. Feenberg seems convinced that Heidegger is caught up in nihilism and that 
his turning cannot happen. Feenberg holds that humanity will continue to reveal all 
entities as resources despite any philosophical revelation Heidegger may have had. 
Despite these criticisms Heideggers philosophy still opens a path for a rich 
philosophical understanding of technology. 
The thesis reveals the saving power as already active in the world through an 
analysis of the use of the German word nach. This word is drawn from the German title 
of QCT, Die Frage nach der Technik. This analysis reveals that the title could be read as 
the Question that is Being Asked after the Technical. This translation reveals that the 
question about technology is already being asked. The question could not have been 
asked unless technology was already revealed for what it truly is, as enframing and as 
being. Thus reflection on technology comes only after it is revealed as being. This 
cannot happen if the enframing holds an unassailable sway. It seems that the turning is 
already happening and that the enframing is already being revealed for what it is. The 
saving power reveals not only being but also humanitys essence, and it frees humanity 
to look out towards God.  
Finally, this thesis makes the move to understand Heideggers notion of God and 
the possible revelation of God through his philosophy of technology. This is an original 
understanding of Heideggers notion of God, and it opens up a new and helpful path to 
understanding Heidegger. The ideas at stake fly against the grain of Dreyfus 
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understanding of Heideggers god, as well as Bothas. It could be that it is the power of 
God, already active in this world that gives the enframing to be revealed as the 
enframing. Indeed the saving power might be thought of as a saving grace in the sense 
that it is a revelation of a salvific deity. It is this deity that takes a care for humanity and 
thus reveals itself through being. It seems that this Deity is not present in this world, and 
that is because the revelation of God is an event that has yet to take place. While being is 
turning and revealing itself in a new way, the hope of the author is that it may yet reveal 
itself as God in a final destining move.  
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